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Cognitive  continuum  theory  points  to the  middle-ground  between  the  intuitive  and  analytic  modes  of
cognition,  called  quasirationality.  In the  context  of  sentencing,  we discuss  how  legal  models  prescribe  the
use of different  modes  of cognition.  These  models  aim  to  help  judges  perform  the  cognitive  balancing  act
required  between  factors  indicating  a more  or less  severe  penalty  for an offender.  We  compare  sentencing
in  three  common  law jurisdictions  (i.e., Australia,  the US,  and  England  and  Wales).  Each  places  a differentual processes
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emphasis  on  the use  of  intuition  and  analysis;  but all  are quasirational.  We conclude  that  the  most
appropriate  mode  of  cognition  will likely  be  that  which  corresponds  best  with  properties  of the  sentencing
task.  Finally,  we  discuss  the  implications  of  this  cognition-task  correspondence  approach  for  researchers
and legal  policy-makers.
©  2014  Society  for Applied  Research  in Memory  and  Cognition.  Published  by Elsevier  Inc.  This  is an
open  access  article under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/. Introduction
According to the normative legal model, the judge, in an unbi-
sed way and directed by the law, carefully attends to all of the
vailable information in a case, weighs it according to its signiﬁ-
ance for the issue at hand, and integrates it to make a decision.
he judge is thus expected to perform a cognitive balancing act
etween factors for and against a speciﬁc decision. A judge’s ability
o perform this feat when making highly consequential decisions
s accepted as a given: when judicial decisions are challenged, this
s rarely on the basis of a judge’s poor or biased decision-making
ut often on some misapplication of law or procedural mistake
Cohen, 2006). Judges, themselves, are highly conﬁdent in their
ecision-making abilities (Dhami & Ayton, 2001). After all, they are
ppointed on the basis of their “sound judgment” (e.g., see Judicial
ppointments Commission, 2011, p. 66).
Past psychological research, however, demonstrates that judges
ay  ﬁnd it difﬁcult to perform this cognitive balancing act. For
nstance, they may  be unduly inﬂuenced by extra-legal factors in a
ase and may  ignore or take insufﬁcient account of legal factors (e.g.,
hami, 2003; Dhami & Ayton, 2001; Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack,
006; Goodman-Delahunty & Sporer, 2010; Guthrie, Rachlinski, &
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211-3681/© 2014 Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition. Published by 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Wistrich, 2001; Manning, Carroll, & Carp, 2004; Mitchell, 2005;
Rachlinski, Johnson, Wistrich, & Guthrie, 2009; Turner & Johnson,
2006; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009). This results in disparities
which erode public conﬁdence in the criminal justice system (e.g.,
Smith, 2007).
Laws and legal policies (i.e., those translating laws into some
form of guidelines) often prescribe how judges should make
decisions. In the present paper, we  use the context of criminal
sentencing to discuss how legal models in this domain prescribe
the use of different modes of cognition, with the assumption
that these can help judges perform the cognitive balancing act
required. Sentencing represents a key stage of the criminal jus-
tice process, and one that has signiﬁcant ramiﬁcations not only
for individual offenders and the public, but also for the wider
justice system. We  compare models of sentencing practice that
currently exist in three common law jurisdictions (i.e., Australia,
the US, and England and Wales), and show how each of these
prescriptive models places a different emphasis on the use of intu-
ition and analysis; but all are quasirational. We argue that in the
absence of an evidence-based approach that shows which sen-
tences (and which models) lead to which outcomes, the most
appropriate mode of cognition for sentencing will likely be that
which corresponds best with properties of the sentencing task.
Finally, we discuss the implications that the above has for future
research and for efforts to improve sentencing decisions. Before
presenting our thesis, we provide a brief review of the literature
on modes of cognition, followed by a description of the sentencing
domain.
Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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. Modes of cognition
According to cognitive theorists, there are different modes of
ognition that have distinct properties. In particular, dual process
heorists (e.g., Epstein, 1991; Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996;
tanovich & West, 2000) have been preoccupied with the cognitive
odes of intuition and analysis (see also Evans, 2008 and Osman,
004. For a more critical perspective on dual process theories, see
.g., Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996; Keren & Schul, 2009; Marewski,
aissmeier & Gigerenzer, 2010).
Intuition (often also referred to as System 1, experiential, heuris-
ic, and associative thinking; see also Glöckner & Witteman, 2010
or different types of intuition), is said to be acquired through a
ong history of evolution, human development and experience,
nd is visual (or non-verbal). It is generally considered to be an
nconscious, implicit, automatic, holistic, fast process, with great
apacity, requiring little cognitive effort. Intuition involves associa-
ive thinking and parallel processing that is affected by context. It is
ndependent of education or intelligence, and is unaffected by the
imits of working memory, but is dependent on prior experience.
By contrast, analysis (often also referred to as System 2, rational,
nalytic, and rule-based thinking) is generally characterized as a
onscious, explicit, controlled, deliberative, ﬂexible, slow process
hat has limited capacity and is cognitively demanding. It is more
ecent in human evolution and uses language. Analysis involves
ule-based thinking and sequential processing that can operate in
bstract or solve logical problems. The use of analysis depends not
nly on formal education and intelligence, but also on the capacity
f working memory.
However, according to Hammond’s (1996, 2000) cognitive con-
inuum theory, there are modes of cognition that lie in-between
ntuition and analysis (see also Dhami & Thomson, 2012). These
re called quasirational modes of cognition. As Hammond (2010, p.
31) points out, the term ‘quasi’ does not mean that quasirational
odes of cognition are the result of “improper cognitive activity”.
ather, quasirationality comprises different combinations of intu-
tion and analysis, and so may  sometimes lie closer to the intuitive
nd of the cognitive continuum and at other times closer to the ana-
ytic end (see also Sloman’s 1996 view that intuition and analysis
re interactive).
Whereas some dual process theorists suggest that intuition is
he default mode of cognition, and that analysis overrides this only
hen necessary (e.g., Evans, 2007, 2008), others claim that intuitive
nd analytic modes compete for supremacy (e.g., Epstein, 1994;
loman, 1996, 2002; Stanovich & West, 2000, 2002). However, for
ammond (1996, 2000), modes of cognition are determined by
roperties of the task (and/or expertise with the task). Others also
tate that decision strategies are adapted to task properties (see
.g., Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999). As we  will
iscuss later, some properties are likely to induce intuition while
thers are more likely to induce analytic cognition. Success on a
ask inhibits movement along the cognitive continuum (or change
n cognitive mode) while failure stimulates it. Movement along the
ognitive continuum is characterized as oscillatory or alternating,
hus allowing different forms of compromise between intuition and
nalysis (i.e., quasirationality).
Although there is a growing body of evidence on the nature
nd performance of intuitive versus analytic cognition (e.g.,
unwoody, Haarbauer, Mahan, Marino, & Tang, 2000; Haberstroh,
008; Hammond, Hamm,  Grassia, & Pearson, 1987; Mahan, 1994;
arewski & Mehlhorn, 2011), there is a distinct dearth of research
n the operation and outcomes of quasirationality. In their recent
fforts to identify the processes involved in intuitive versus analytic
ognition, Glöckner and his colleagues have found some similari-
ies and differences between these two modes of cognition (e.g.,
löckner & Betsch, 2008a, 2008b, 2012; Horstmann, Ahlgrimm, Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 239–247
& Glöckner, 2009; Jekel, Glöckner, Fiedler, & Bröder, in press. For
a critical response to Glöckner et al.’s integrative approach see
Marewski, 2010 and Marewski & Link, 2014). The empirical ﬁnd-
ings suggest that the two  modes of cognition may  operate in an
integrative fashion and thus potentially shed light on different
forms of quasirationality. For instance, quasirationality may  allow
individuals to use a lot of information fast. Other work measur-
ing the performance of different modes of cognition, for example
by Blattberg and Hoch (1990), has demonstrated that a quasira-
tional model which combined managerial intuition (expertise) and
statistical analysis repeatedly outperformed purely intuitive and
statistical models in ﬁve forecasting tasks (see also Ganzach, Kluger,
& Klayman, 2000). Before we consider how speciﬁc modes of cog-
nition are prescribed in different models of sentencing practice, we
provide a brief description of the generic sentencing task.
3. Sentencing: a goal-oriented behavior occurring within
constraints
A sentence is passed on an offender who has either pleaded
guilty to an offence or been convicted of one. Ofﬁcially, sentencing
may  be geared towards achieving one or more (sometimes compet-
ing) goals. These are punishing offenders justiﬁed on the grounds
of desert or retribution, reducing crime via deterrence, rehabilitat-
ing offenders, protecting the public via incapacitation, and making
reparations to victims (e.g., see Australian Law Reform Commission,
2006; Seghetti & Smith, 2007; Sentencing Council, 2013b).
Sentences are often determined within a number of constraints.
Offences may  have ﬁxed maximum penalties assigned to them,
usually in the form of a length of custody or ﬁne amount, and
may  have mandatory minimum sentences. In addition, the avail-
able sentencing options (e.g., custody, community penalty, ﬁne, and
compensation) may  be restricted by offence type (i.e., more or less
serious offences) and by offender age (i.e., adult or youth).
Thus, with a set of goals in mind and within certain constraints,
judges must determine an appropriate sentence for an offence
(and offender). Sentencing is often predicated on the principle that
each case is unique and dealt with on its own  merits (e.g., see
Sentencing Council, 2013a; United States Sentencing Commission,
2006). Judges are expected to consider legal factors such as the
nature and seriousness of the offence and the offender’s criminal
history, and may  take into account relevant aggravating and mit-
igating factors (e.g., vulnerability of the victim and whether the
offender was  provoked or showed remorse). Judges may also have
access to sentencing recommendations provided by a probation
ofﬁcer or other professional, who assesses the potential impact of
the sentence on the offender (and victim or society). Judges may
also give a discount for a guilty plea (which reduces the severity of
the ﬁnal sentence), and they may consider the proportionality or
‘totality’ of a sentence, if the offender is to be sentenced for more
than one offence. Finally, judges often have to give a reason for the
sentence they pass.
The decision-making model that judges can apply differs across
jurisdictions depending on whether, and how, sentencing laws are
translated into sentencing guidelines. Reitz (2006) suggests that
sentencing (and guideline) systems lie along a continuum ran-
ging from discretionary to rule-based. Guidelines typically limit or
control judicial discretion. They aim to focus judges’ attention on
legal factors and reduce the impact of extra-legal ones, as well as
promote consistent decision-making both in terms of process and
outcomes. In addition, guidelines sometimes aim to achieve effec-
tive sentencing in terms of reducing crime and increasing public
safety, as well as acting as a resource management tool by increas-
ing the cost-effectiveness of sentences. Finally, guidelines may  aim
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o increase public understanding and conﬁdence in sentencing,
ncluding victim satisfaction.
However, to date, some jurisdictions have rejected sentencing
uidelines. For instance, Australian state/territory and federal juris-
ictions have resisted their introduction, and some would argue
hat judges have unfettered discretion (Krasnostein & Freiberg,
013). By contrast, other jurisdictions in the US and England and
ales have introduced sentencing guidelines. Guidelines in many
S states and the federal system are numerical, grid-based systems
see Frase, 2005a). By contrast, the guidelines recently introduced
n England and Wales are narrative or text-based, offering a step-
y-step guide (see Dhami, 2013a; Roberts, 2013). Thus, these two
ypes of guidelines aim to control judicial discretion in different
ays and to different degrees.
. Quasirational models of sentencing
We  contend that all jurisdictions prescribe a quasirational
pproach to sentencing, but that those who have rejected guide-
ines endorse a mode of quasirationality that lies closer to the
ntuitive end of the cognitive continuum. In addition, we  suggest
hat jurisdictions which have adopted numerical, grid-based guide-
ines promote a mode of quasirationality that lies closer to the
nalytic end, whereas those that have adopted text-based, step-by-
tep guidelines encourage a greater balance between intuition and
nalysis. Below, we discuss the mode of cognition that dominates
n each of the three sentencing (and guideline) systems mentioned
bove (i.e., Australia, in the US, and England and Wales). It is beyond
he scope of the present paper to provide a comprehensive and in-
epth description of these systems (interested readers are referred
o Ashworth & Roberts, 2013; Edney & Bagaric, 2013; Frase, 2005a;
onry & Frase, 2001).
.1. ‘Instinctive synthesis’ in Australian sentencing
Australia’s approach to sentencing at both the state/territory
nd federal level is formalized through the concept of ‘instinc-
ive synthesis’ (sometimes called ‘intuitive synthesis’). Instinctive
ynthesis views sentencing as a holistic, parallel process requiring
reat cognitive capacity. This view was ﬁrst articulated by the Vic-
orian Supreme Court in R v Williscroft (1975) and later approved
y the High Court of Australia, in for example, Wong v The Queen
2001, at [74–76]), where the court stated that “the task of the sen-
encer is to take account of all the relevant factors and to arrive at
 single result which takes due account of them all.”
Similarly, the idea that sentencing is more intuitive than ana-
ytic, relying on experience, associative processes and context, was
e-afﬁrmed in the decision by the High Court in Markarian v The
ueen (2005). Judge McHugh claimed that “there is no Aladdin’s
ave of accurate sentencing methodology.  . . There is only human
udgment based on all the facts of the case, the judge’s experience,
he data derived from comparable sentences and the guidelines
nd principles authoritatively laid down in statutes and authorita-
ive judgments” (at [71]). “Discretionary sentencing is not capable
f mathematical precision or, for that matter, approximation” (at
65]).
One argument for the usefulness of intuition in sentencing
erives from the notion of judges as experts in their ﬁeld, which
s also compatible with the idea that intuition relies heavily on
mplicit, associative processing and recognition (e.g., Klein, 2003;
imon, 1992). There is a common view amongst judges that “judi-
ial experience in sentencing is a skill. . . Repeated exercise in
ynthesising sentencing factors can only hone the instinct required
o translate such factors into just numerical outcomes,” (McHugh in
arkarian v The Queen,  2005 at [78]). The former High Court Justice Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 239–247 241
Michael Kirby (Kirby, 1998, para. 15), views intuition as “simply
the application to a particular case of the accumulated experience
of professional life.”
A number of recent developments have led to a somewhat more
structured sentencing environment in Australia (see Krasnostein
& Freiberg, 2013). For instance, some states/territories provide
guideline judgements (i.e., model sentences passed by judges as
examples to be followed for speciﬁc types of offences), baseline
or minimum sentences in addition to maximums, and statistics
on past sentencing practices. However, Australian sentencers still
retain a signiﬁcant degree of control over the sentencing process.
Thus, there remains in Australia an overwhelming emphasis on
the retention of judicial discretion. Both state/territory and fed-
eral jurisdictions have rejected the possibility of introducing any
kind of formal sentencing guidelines (e.g. Australian Law Reform
Commission, 2006). Although there is consensus that sentencing
in Australia involves judicial intuition, there is some disagreement
about the nature of the cognitive process involved. Glöckner and
Witteman (2010, p. 1) differentiate between four different forms
of intuitive processing, namely, “(a) associative intuition based
on simple learning–retrieval processes, (b) matching intuition
based on comparisons with prototypes/exemplars, (c) accumula-
tive intuition based on automatic evidence accumulation, and (d)
constructive intuition based on construction of mental representa-
tions.” Kirby’s (1998) view is compatible with the idea of ‘matching
intuition’ whereas the Australian High Court’s majority viewpoint
(especially in McHugh’s remarks) is more indicative of ‘constructive
intuition.’
Some researchers have argued that intuition is useful (e.g.,
Hogarth, 2001; Klein, 2003; Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1993) and
can lead to good decision-making performance (e.g., Dane & Pratt,
2007; Gigerenzer, 2007; Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Salas, Rosen &
DiazGranados, 2010). However, effective intuition relies on learn-
ing appropriate decision strategies. Such learning is also useful
in the consistent application of these strategies. An individual
may  only be able to develop effective intuition when he/she has
unequivocal feedback (Glöckner & Witteman, 2010; Kahneman &
Klein, 2009; Shanteau, 1992). However, as Harvey (2011) points
out, feedback may  simply not facilitate learning in some complex
tasks.
The sentencing task is complex. Sentencers receive little or
no feedback on the outcomes of their own or others’ sentenc-
ing decisions, and although ofﬁcial statistics on issues such as
recidivism (reoffending) rates may  be available, these are averages
over offence types, offender types and court types, and are often
unreliable (e.g., Hedderman, 2009; Richards, 2011). Some form of
feedback may  be available when a decision is appealed, but this
is rare, and successful appeals largely reﬂect concerns over lack
of due process rather than the outcome (Brignell & Donnelly, 2005;
Sentencing Advisory Council, 2012). Thus, at most, judges may  have
available to them decisions made by others (and themselves) on
comparable cases. If judges can develop useful intuition, it will be
in relation to what the ‘going rate’ tariff is for a particular com-
bination of offender and offence factors rather than in relation to
passing sentences that are effective in achieving their goals (e.g.,
deterrence).
The dominant role of intuition in the instinctive synthesis
approach to sentencing has attracted criticism from both academics
(e.g., Bagaric, 1999; Edney, 2005; Edney & Bagaric, 2013; Freiberg
& Krasnostein, 2011) and judges (e.g., Kirby, 1998). There are con-
cerns over the lack of explanation that can be provided for intuitive
judgments. For example, Judge Hulme observed in R v Markarian
(2003 at [33]) that where a sentence is reached using instinctive
synthesis, it makes one “wonder whether ﬁgures have not just been
plucked out of the air”. Indeed, the implicit nature of intuition may
make it difﬁcult for judges to externalize their decision-making,
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nd so the reasons they are required to give for their sentence may
imply be post hoc rationalizations rather than veridical accounts
f their cognitive processing (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). A lack of
ransparency has been associated with public dissatisfaction with
entencing (Indermaur, 2008).
There are also concerns that intuitive decisions are too sus-
eptible to extra-legal inﬂuences, including from judges’ personal
haracteristics and experiences (see Sporer & Goodman-Delahunty,
009). Justice Kirby (1998, p. 16) observed that “intuition may
tself be the product of unrecognized psychological forces, cultural
ssumptions and social attitudes. . .”  Edney (2005, p. 57) notes that
if the ‘instinct’ of the judicial move to sentence cannot be rea-
oned and detailed, is it simply no more than an emotional, gut
eaction to the offence and offender?”. Indeed, there is an abundant
ody of psychological research attesting to the deleterious effects
f unwanted inﬂuences on human decision-making (see Gilovich,
rifﬁn, & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).
.2. Striving for rational, rule-based sentencing in the US
The weaknesses inherent in intuitive decision-making suggest
hat perhaps an analytic approach to sentencing would be bet-
er able to deliver sentences that enable judges to achieve their
oals. To this end, a number of US jurisdictions including Min-
esota, Kansas, North Carolina, Virginia, Oregon, Washington and
he federal courts have introduced highly structured, numerical,
rid-based guidelines (see Frase, 2005b; National Center for State
ourts, 2008). All of these promote explicit, deliberative processing,
nd all, to a lesser or greater extent, limit a sentencer’s ability to
epart from prescribed standard sentences.
A prominent example are the Minnesota guidelines which apply
o all felonies (as deﬁned in the Minnesota Criminal Code, 2006,
ubdivision 2). The guidelines use a rule-based format, and speciﬁc
nformation is considered in sequence. Individual cases are con-
idered in the ‘abstract’ (i.e., in relation to groups of offences and
ffenders).
Speciﬁcally, the guidelines comprise two axes, namely, offence
eriousness and the offender’s criminal history. The point along the
rid where these two dimensions intersect determines the range
n which the sentence may  fall. In order to reach this intersection,
rst, the judge identiﬁes the severity of the offence on a scale from 1
o 11, with 11 being the most severe, by consulting reference tables
hat list the severity level assigned to each offence (Minnesota
entencing Guidelines Commission, 2012a, pp. 77–117). For the
ajority of offences, there is no ﬂexibility in the assignment of
everity. The judge then establishes the offender’s criminal history
core, on a scale from 0 to ‘6 or more’, with ‘6 or more’ indicat-
ng the most extensive criminal history, based on the offender’s
urrent and prior offences and custody status at the time of the
ffence. This is an entirely formulaic process with little or no scope
or subjective input. Finally, the sentence is determined by consul-
ing a two-dimensional grid with offence severity on the Y-axis and
he offender’s criminal history category on the X-axis.
Where the grid states the sentence should be custodial, a dis-
retionary range within which the sentence must be ﬁxed is
lso listed. Non-custodial sentences have no such discretionary
ange and the judge can set the precise terms of the sentence,
hich typically include probation plus other obligations such as
nes, treatment programs, community work and/or house arrest
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, 2012b). The guide-
ines are ‘presumptive’ in that the sentences speciﬁed in the grids
re presumed to be appropriate. However, judges may  depart from guideline sentence by citing “substantial and compelling circum-
tances” (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, 2012a, p.
). In 2011, only 26.5% of sentences departed from the presumptive
entence (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, 2013). Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 239–247
One could argue that a predominately analytic approach to
sentencing is potentially useful because it can reduce unwanted
sentencing disparity by increasing uniformity (similar offenders
committing similar offences are punished equivalently), and it sup-
ports a consistent approach to proportionality (different offenders
committing different offences receive appropriately different sen-
tences). In addition, grid-based guidelines appear to be transparent
and advocate certainty of outcome. However, such an analytical
approach to sentencing requires that efforts are made to ensure
the factors to be considered are the most appropriate ones, namely,
they can help achieve the goals of sentencing. Errors made early on
in the process (e.g., about offence seriousness) can have signiﬁcant
ramiﬁcations later on. And, these errors will be repeated since this
approach is applied consistently across cases. Indeed, Ruback and
Wroblewski (2001) argue that the aggravating factors included in
the federal guidelines have limited reliability and validity, and this
leads to lower quality decisions.
The US numerical, grid-based guidelines have been criticized
both in the US and elsewhere. Some have argued that they are
too complex (e.g., Ruback & Wroblewski, 2001; Sessions, 2010).
The federal guidelines are particularly complex, with six different
categories of criminal history and 43 categories of offence sever-
ity (United States Sentencing Commission, 2012a). Ruback and
Wroblewski (2001, p.769) argue that the complexity of the fed-
eral guidelines has lowered both the quality of the decisions and
the motivation of judges, whose “craft” has been “deskilled” and
who feel “alienated from their jobs”.
The analytic approach to sentencing has also been criticized
for being too rigid, mechanistic, restrictive and inﬂexible (Aas,
2005; Council of HM Circuit Judges, 2008; Freed, 1992; Judiciary of
England and Wales, 2008; Ruback & Wroblewski, 2001; Schulhofer,
1992; Sessions, 2010; Stith & Cabranes, 1998; Tonry, 1996; but
see Reitz, 2006). Such guidelines have fairly narrow sentencing
ranges. This leaves “little room for judicial creativity” (Wasik, 2008,
p. 201), and generates excessive uniformity in sentences, especially
when there are few acceptable grounds for departure. Critics argue
that both offences and offenders are complex in terms of their
number and nature of variables and the inter-relations between
these variables as well as their determinants. Numerical, grid-based
guidelines appear to take insufﬁcient account of offenders’ per-
sonal circumstances and seem too crude, narrow and blunt to allow
truly individualized sentencing. However, adding such complex-
ity to an analytic sentencing approach would render it potentially
intractable.
Others maintain that the US guidelines appear to be an imper-
sonal, arbitrary “sentencing machine” (Tonry, 1996, p. 91). The idea
that the characteristics of each offence and offender can be objec-
tively measured, weighted and combined by some algorithmic
formula is said to be dehumanizing (Aas, 2005). Indeed, the numer-
ical, grid-based approach appears incompatible with the notion
that sentencing is ultimately a “human process” (Traynor & Potas,
2002, p. 22), and extrapolating what is a ‘fair’ sentence from gen-
eral penal principles or populations of offenders and then applying
that to individual situations appears conceptually questionable. It
is arguable that a sentence can only be ‘fair’ in relation to a speciﬁc
offender who has committed a particular offence. In their rejection
of the US approach, the Australian Law Reform Commission (2006,
p. 538) concluded that grid-based sentencing “inappropriately pri-
oritises consistency over individualised justice”.
Finally, others have pointed out that numerical, grid-based
guidelines do not necessarily reduce unwanted disparities and
biases in sentencing. For instance, a 15-year review of the US  fed-
eral sentencing guidelines concluded that there were both positive
and negative outcomes associated with their use (United States
Sentencing Commission, 2005). The guidelines increased the trans-
parency and predictability of sentencing and reduced inter-judge
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nd regional disparities. On the other hand, they also reduced the
se of simple probation while dramatically increasing the use and
ength of incarceration. The guidelines failed to reduce inter-judge
isparities for some offences, and regional differences for some
ffences actually increased. In addition, the guidelines failed to
radicate some ethnic/race and gender disparities in sentencing.
otably, these mandatory federal guidelines became merely advi-
ory following a legal challenge in the US Supreme Court (Seghetti
 Smith, 2007), and some claim this has lead to greater departures
nd increased disparities (Sessions, 2010). Evidence produced by
he US Sentencing Commission supports this conclusion (United
tates Sentencing Commission, 2012b; see also Yang, 2014).
.3. Balancing intuition and analysis: sentencing guidelines in
ngland and Wales
The English approach to sentencing lies in-between the US and
ustralian approaches. Sentencing guidelines were ﬁrst introduced
n England and Wales in 2004 following John Halliday’s (2001, p. 54)
dvice that the goal “should be structured and principled decision
aking, not adherence to pre-determined outcomes, and within
 framework based on deliberation and consultation, accessible to
ll, and capable of being modiﬁed in the light of experience.” Thus,
n a compromise between intuition and analysis, the sentencing
uidelines in England and Wales promote an approach to sentenc-
ng that mandates a step-by-step process, which retains sufﬁcient
iscretion to allow ﬂexibility in response to factual elements unique
o each case while simultaneously guiding that discretion so as to
ncourage consistency of process and outcome.
The guidelines are produced for speciﬁc offences (and categories
f offences) such as assaults (Sentencing Council, 2011), as well as
or generic issues such as reduction in sentence for a guilty plea
Sentencing Council, 2007). The current offence-speciﬁc guidelines
mploy a nine-step process (previously eight steps; see Dhami,
013a and Roberts, 2013). The ﬁrst step involves determination of
he relevant offence category (i.e., level of offence seriousness). This
ombines consideration of the degree of harm caused and the cul-
ability of the offender; with there being three possible degrees of
eriousness (i.e., greater harm and higher culpability, greater harm
nd lower culpability or lesser harm and higher culpability, and
esser harm and lower culpability). Judges are provided with a list
f the factors whose presence should indicate greater harm and
igher culpability.
The second step requires identiﬁcation of the appropriate cat-
gory range (i.e., the range of sentence appropriate for a level of
ffence seriousness) and starting point within that range. The start-
ng point applies to all offenders irrespective of plea or previous
onvictions. A list of aggravating and mitigating factors is pro-
ided that, in combination, may  give judges reasons for upward
nd downward departures from the starting point (and even to
ove outside the category range where appropriate). In addition,
he presence of multiple factors indicating higher culpability can
lso warrant upward departures.
Step three ensures consideration of any factors (e.g., offender’s
ssistance to prosecution) that should indicate a reduction in sen-
ence. Step four requires that a reduction in sentence is given for a
uilty plea (and there is a separate guideline helping judges cal-
ulate the amount of reduction to be applied depending on the
tage in the criminal justice process where the offender pleaded
uilty; Sentencing Council, 2007). Step ﬁve involves determination
f the degree of dangerousness of the offender and whether that
ould indicate an indeterminate sentence (i.e., where the court sets
 minimum term of imprisonment to be served before the offender
s eligible for parole). Step six requires judges to apply the ‘total-
ty principle’ when sentencing for more than one offence so the Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 239–247 243
total sentence is ‘just and proportionate’ (and there is a separate
guideline aiding judges in this task; Sentencing Council, 2012).
Once the ﬁnal sentence has been reached, step seven ensures
that judges also consider if it is appropriate to impose a compen-
sation order and/or ancillary orders (e.g., driving disqualiﬁcation,
restraining order). Step eight requires judges to provide reasons
for their sentence and explain its (potential) effect. Finally, step
nine ensures that judges consider a reduction in sentence for any
time spent on remand in custody while awaiting trial and sentence.
In addition, where relevant, the guidelines may  include an annex,
which, for example, sets out the notion of ﬁne bands and commu-
nity orders. The ﬁne bands have starting points and category ranges,
and the community orders are ranked as low, medium and high.
The courts must follow the sentencing guidelines unless ‘it
would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so’ (Coroners
and Justice Act, 2009, section 125). To-date, as little as 4% or fewer
sentences have fallen outside the category range for offences cov-
ered by the guidelines for assault, burglary and drugs (Sentencing
Council, 2013a).
Therefore, the English approach to sentencing guidelines is
somewhat more complex than the US approach because it involves
more steps, but also more transparent than the Australian approach
because it speciﬁes the process involved at speciﬁc steps. English
judges were opposed to the US approach because it was  seen to
be too restrictive of their discretion and would make it difﬁcult for
them to pass individualized sentences (Gage, 2008). Hutton (2013,
p. 102) states that the English guidelines “do not prescribe a ‘cor-
rect’ sentence: they do not provide a formula or algorithm which
can be applied by any judicial ofﬁcer to generate the right sentence
for a case. Guidelines leave a space for the exercise of judgment
and the decision made in this space is justiﬁed by the argument
that sentencing is a matter of judgment at the level of the individ-
ual case. So two modes of justiﬁcation sit side by side: a formal
process of accountability set by the legislation and the guidelines
and substantive justiﬁcation encapsulated by the term ‘instinctive
synthesis.”’
In both England and Wales and Australia, judges must use their
intuition to assimilate factors into an appropriate sentence. The
difference between these jurisdictions lies in the relative emphasis
given to intuition and analysis. The Australian High Court rejected
any sentencing approach articulated in terms of multiple stages or
steps as depicted by the English guidelines, viewing it as overly
mechanical and likely to result in an overemphasis on the objec-
tive seriousness of the offence (Markarian v The Queen,  2005). In
Australia, intuition is paramount when the judge uses factors that
he/she deems to be relevant (in addition to those that are speciﬁed
by legislation) to reach a ﬁnal tariff, subject to any applicable legis-
lation regarding maximum or minimum sentences. By contrast, in
England and Wales, the factors to be considered at each stage of the
sentencing process are made more explicit, along with the direc-
tion in which they point (e.g., greater harm). In addition, the starting
sentence is prescribed for given levels of offence seriousness.
No evaluation research has yet been conducted to examine if
the English guidelines have helped judges achieve their sentenc-
ing goals. A recent survey of judges by Dhami (2013b) revealed
that they believed the guidelines could increase the consistency of
sentences passed by different judges on similar types of cases, as
well as the consistency of sentences passed by individual judges
across similar types of cases over time. Judges also said the guide-
lines were useful. Although to a lesser extent, they also thought that
guidelines had increased their awareness of their own sentencing
practice and their conﬁdence in their sentencing decisions. How-
ever, judges were less likely to think that guidelines could reduce
the impact of extraneous factors in sentencing.
The approach to sentencing in England and Wales has also
invited some criticism from those who believe the guidelines allow
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or too much discretion (Dhami, 2013a, 2013b; Hutton, 2013; Reitz,
013). The English guidelines are accused of being ambiguous,
acking in precision and transparency, and affording too much sub-
ective interpretation. One proposed solution is for judges to give
ore detailed reasons for departures (Reitz, 2013), although this
ay  be difﬁcult where intuition guides the departures. Another
olution is to introduce greater structure (Dhami, 2013a; Reitz,
013), and to this end, Dhami (2013a, 2013b), who  acted as an
dvisor to the Sentencing Council for the current guidelines, pro-
oses the use of a ﬂowchart format. However, judges may  be
ritical of guidelines that are highly speciﬁed and which move
hem closer to the analytic end of the cognitive continuum. As
hami (2013b) found, judges typically disagreed with proposals
hat would enable sentencing guidelines to better guide their
ecision-making process. These proposals included specifying the
actors to be considered, as well as how they should be weighted
nd integrated.
.4. Summary: models of sentencing
The grid-based sentencing guidelines in the US and the step-
y-step guidelines in England and Wales both prescribe a process
here the cognitive task of sentencing is broken down into its
omponent parts. In England and Wales, these are: determining
he offence category, locating a sentence along the category range,
onsidering reduction for a guilty plea, considering dangerous, and
onsidering totality if relevant. In the Minnesota guidelines, the
omponent parts of the sentencing task are: determining offence
everity, calculating the criminal history score, consulting the sen-
encing grid, and making an adjustment if necessary. By contrast to
he above two approaches, in Australia sentencing is a more holis-
ic process where the sentencer identiﬁes the factors considered
o be relevant (according to legal policy and themselves) and then
eighs and integrates them in a manner of his or her choosing.
. Correspondence between cognition and task
Theoretically speaking, the most appropriate mode of cognition
or the sentencing task should be determined by the type of strat-
gy required for reaching a sentencing decision that can best help a
udge achieve his/her goals. However, the goals of sentencing can be
ultiple and competing. In addition, there has been little effort to
mpirically determine how best to achieve these goals, and conse-
uently, what type of decision strategy will be most effective. Thus,
n the absence of an evidence-based approach showing which sen-
ences and which sentencing models lead to which outcomes, the
ost appropriate mode of cognition may  simply be that which is
ost practical given the properties of the sentencing task.
Many cognitive theorists have stressed the importance of the
orrespondence or ﬁt between the mode of cognition and prop-
rties of the task (e.g., Anderson, 1990; Gigerenzer et al., 1999;
ammond, 1996, 2000; Howes, Lewis, & Vera, 2009; Marewski &
chooler, 2011; Simon, 1956, 1990. For early work see Brunswik,
943, 1952, 1956). In particular, Hammond (1996, 2000) states that
ognitive modes are induced by task properties and experience
ith the task (see also Epstein’s 1991 idea that task stimuli activate
ifferent modes of cognition). According to Hammond, cognitive
asks can be differentiated from one another with regard to their
roperties as well as the mode of cognition they may  induce (see
lso Dhami & Thomson, 2012). There is evidence that cognitive
ode can shift during a task (e.g., Hamm,  1988).
Task properties include, for example, the amount of informa-
ion, its degree of redundancy, format, and order of presentation,
s well as the decision-maker’s familiarity with the task, opportu-
ity for feedback, and extent of time pressure. Properties such as Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 239–247
familiarity with the task, a lot of information, information that is
subjectively interpreted, and many response options are believed
to be more likely to induce intuition than analysis. By contrast,
tasks comprising properties such as unfamiliarity with the task,
little information, information that is objectively interpreted, and
few response options are said to be more likely to induce analysis
than intuition.
The cognitive mode induced will depend on the number, nature
and degree of task properties present. A task comprising either
intermediate levels of, or a combination of, those properties
inducing pure intuition or pure analysis will instead induce quasir-
ationality. Depending on the task properties, quasirationality may
imply a combination where there is greater use of intuition than
analysis, or vice versa. Hammond (1988) predicted that decision-
making performance is contingent on the degree of correspondence
between the task properties and the mode of cognition applied;
implying that pure analysis may  be neither necessary nor sufﬁcient
for ceiling-level performance. Indeed, evidence suggests that task
characteristics are important in determining the upper bound for
performance (e.g., Seifert & Hadida, 2013), and that achievement is
greater when the cognitive mode matches that induced by the task
(e.g., Dunwoody et al., 2000; Hammond et al., 1987).
The generic sentencing task described earlier includes several
properties predicted by Hammond to induce intuition. For exam-
ple, a large number of factors must be considered; some of these
factors may  be highly inter-correlated; many of the factors must
be assessed subjectively; and there are many sentencing options.
In addition, judges can make sentencing decisions routinely, thus
allowing them to become familiar with the task. However, sev-
eral other properties of the sentencing task are predicted to induce
analysis. For example, information is presented sequentially and
in verbal or textual format. There is no time pressure, but also no
outcome feedback. Finally, the requirement for judges to give rea-
sons for their decisions and to be aware of sentencing laws is more
likely to induce analysis. Thus, the sentencing task presents many
obstacles and challenges to the use of pure analysis or intuition.
For this reason, Hammond (1996) views sentencing as a task that
requires application of a mode of cognition that lies in the middle
range of the cognitive continuum (with intuition and analysis at
each end). He states that “One of the clearest examples of the role
of quasirationality in policy formation can be seen in the effort to
ﬁnd a compromise between the discretionary powers of judges and
the provision of sentencing guidelines.” (p. 176).
Sentencing using the English guidelines is more explicit and
deliberative than in the Australian system, but less rule-based
than that in the US. The English guidelines require more cogni-
tive effort than the Australian approach, and are also slower than
the US approach. However, the quasirational approach to sentenc-
ing in England and Wales means that judges are better able to deal
with complex verbal and non-verbal factors. They are encouraged
to use both parallel and sequential processing. Finally, judges are
encouraged to consider cases in the abstract as well as in their indi-
vidualized contexts. Thus, the model of sentencing prescribed in
England and Wales has greater correspondence between the task
and cognition.
6. Conclusion and implications
In the present paper, we  discussed various ways in which
judges, when sentencing, try to achieve the cognitive balancing
act required between factors that indicate a more or less severe
penalty for an offender. In principle, all of the jurisdictions we have
examined (i.e., Australia, in the US, and England and Wales) pre-
scribe a quasirational approach to sentencing. However, in rejecting
sentencing guidelines, the Australian model endorses a mode of
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uasirationality that lies closer to the intuitive end of the cognitive
ontinuum. By contrast, in efforts to limit or control judicial dis-
retion, the US numerical, grid-based guidelines endorse a mode
f quasirationality that lies closer to the analytic end. Finally, the
tep-by-step guidelines in England and Wales promote a greater
ompromise between intuition and analysis.
The key question for legal policy-makers in jurisdictions across
he world has been where the balance should lie between judicial
ntuition and analysis. The extensive body of psychological research
ighlighting the errors and biases that might result from intuitive
udgement suggests that the balance may  need to shift further
owards a structured, analytic approach to sentencing. However,
entencing closer to the analytic end of the cognitive continuum
s a disturbingly dehumanizing experience. Until the task of sen-
encing becomes evidence-based (e.g., where judges know what
ype of sentence and how much of it is required to achieve goals
uch as deterrence), we propose that a quasirational mode lying in
he mid-point of the cognitive continuum may  be most appropri-
te and practical. This is because the sentencing task, as it stands,
omprises a combination of those properties that induce intuition
nd analysis.
According to Hammond (1996, p. 175) the main advantage of
uasirationality is that “It is far easier to reach a compromise on a
olicy or plan within a framework of quasirationality than if either
olar form of cognition is controlling the process. Strict adher-
nce to intuition demands that the mysteries of judgment be left
ntouched by criticism; strict adherence to analysis is intolerant
f deviations from any step in the process.” Glöckner and his col-
eagues have also suggested that quasirationality can harness the
nique advantages of intuitive and analytic cognition (Glöckner &
etsch, 2008a, 2008b, 2012; Horstmann et al., 2009; Jekel et al., in
ress).
A  ‘cognition-task’ correspondence approach to sentencing has
lear implications for both researchers and legal policy-makers.
n their efforts to improve sentencing decisions, policy-makers
hould develop prescriptive models (i.e., sentencing guidelines)
hat encourage a mode of cognition which corresponds with prop-
rties of the task. In order to do this, they must identify properties
f the task, attempt to alter properties which may  lead to biased or
nconsistent decisions, and provide the decision-maker with aids
hat help overcome any cognitive limitations (i.e., attention, mem-
ry and processing capacity) so they can comfortably apply the
rescribed mode of cognition.
Thus, researchers must provide the evidence necessary for such
egal reforms. They should examine the effects of speciﬁc proper-
ies of the sentencing task both in isolation and in combination on
he sentencing process and decision. This will require researchers
o deconstruct the sentencing task (see Dhami, Hertwig, & Hoffrage,
004). Researchers will also need to obtain multiple dependent
easures that signify the use of different modes of cogni-
ive processing (see Glöckner & Witteman, 2010). In addition,
esearchers should also seek to develop and test decision aids
hat can effectively help sentencers apply the prescribed mode of
ognition.
Finally, research should also explore the mode of cognition
nduced by the different sentencing models currently being pre-
cribed across different jurisdictions, and their effects on the use
f extra-legal factors, the sentences passed, and the consistency
f these sentences. As Engel and Weber (2007, p. 323) point out,
how we decide often determines what we decide”. Through shap-
ng tasks, decision-making modes and the resources available,
egal institutions can, and have, inﬂuenced how sentencing judges
ecide. However, it is not always clear if this has also affected
hat they decide, and so future research should compare the effect
f different decision strategies (models) on the sentences meted
ut. Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 239–247 245
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